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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
or a misnomer 0 and as such the trend is not to extend it" beyond
the cases of fraud or cases of settled part performance. 2 It is
generally recognized that any greater liberalization of the doctrine, so
as to include acts which are factually referable but legally unrelated,
would amount to a practical abrogation of the policy of the Statute
of Frauds.13
ROBERT E. SHARP
Insurance-Construction of "Omnibus" Provisions-On Decem-
ber 20, 1948, plaintiff was driving a truck of his employer, Omar,
Incorporated, in the course of his employment. It was one of four
vehicles, three of them Omar trucks and one of them a private auto-
mobile owned and driven by Paul Wimmer, all of them being driven
from Beloit to Milwaukee. Plaintiff's truck was second in line. All four
drivers were employees of Omar and all were in the course of their
employment.
A Midland Coach Lines bus was being driven in the opposiite
direction on the highway. After colliding with one of the Omar trucks,
the bus struck the plaintiff's truck, and plaintiff received injuries for
which he sought damages against Midland Coach Lines and Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Company, Midland's insurer. These de-
fendants interpleaded and cross-complained against the other Omar
drivers involved, Omar, Incorporated, and London Guarantee and
Accident Company, Ltd., Omar's insurer. On the basis of its contract
with Omar, and on the authority of Schneider v. Depiesl which had
just been decided, London Guarantee brought a motion for summary
judgment. The motion was denied and London Guarantee appealed.
Held: Affirmed. Shanahan v. Midland Coach Lines, 268 Wis. 233,
67 N.W. 2d 297 (1954).
The omnibus clause for the State of Wisconsin is found at Section
204.30(3), Wis. Stats. (1953), and provides:
"No such policy shall be issued or delivered in this state to the
owner of a motor vehicle, unless it contains a provision reading
substantially as follows: The indemnity provided by this policy
10 Fairall v. Arnold, 226 Iowa 977, 285 N.W. 664 (1939) ; Trebesch v. Trebesch,
130 Minn. 368, 153 N.W. 754 (1915).
1135 MmIN.L.REv. 1 (1950); 78 U.OFPA.L.REv. 51.
12 See footnote 15, 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §11.7 for list of articles sus-
taining this trend in the various jurisdictions.
1349 AM. JuR. 533; 37 MINN.L.REv. 459. In England there has been a movement
to abolish the Statute of Frauds, as pointed out in 70 LAW Q. REv. 441. How-
ever this has generally been resisted in the United States, as is pointed out in
French v. Mitchell, 92 Colo. 532, 22 P,2d 644 (1933) where Justice Bouck
writes, "Nevertheless the statute has survived these attacks; and the tendency
of modern decisions is to maintain its substantial provisions according to its
true spirit and purpose and not to indefinitely multiply exceptions thereto."
1 Schneider v. Depies, 266 Wis. 43, 62 N.W.2d 431 (1954).
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is extended to apply, in the same manner and under the same
provisions as it is applicable to the named assured, to any person
or persons while riding in or operating any automobile described
in this policy when such automobile is being used for purposes
and in the manner described in said policy. Such indemnity
shall also extend to any person, firm, or corporation legally
responsible for the operation of such automobile. The insurance
hereby afforded shall not apply unless the riding, use, or opera-
tion above referred to be with the permission of the assured
named in this policy, or if such assured is an individual, with
the permission of an adult member of such assured's household
other than a chauffeur or domestic servant; provided, however,
that no insurance afforded by this paragraph shall apply to a
public automobile garage or an automobile repair shop, sales
agency, service station, and/or the agents or employees thereof.
In the event an automobile covered by this policy is sold or
transferred, the purchaser or transferee shall not be an addi-
tional insured without consent of the company, indorsed hereon.
It will be noted that the only exceptions that the statute makes
from its operation are public automobile garages, automobile repair
shops, sales agencies, service stations, and/or the agents or employees
thereof.2 We can quickly perceive that these exceptions have no ap-
plication in the instant situation. The policy of the statute is crystal
clear. It is well established that any intended limitation of the omnibus
coverage provision required by the statute other than the exceptions
expressly authorized therein, is void3
The policy issued by London Guarantee to Omar contained the
following provision:
"III. Definition of Insured.
With respect to the insurance for bodily injury liability and
for property damage liability the unqualified word 'insured'
includes the named insured and also includes any person while
using the automobile and any person or organization legally
responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the
automobile is by the named insured or with his permission. The
insurance with respect to any person or organization other than
the named insured does not apply: * * *
"(b) to any employee with respect to injury to or sickness,
disease, or death of another employee of the same employer
injured in the course of such employment in an accident arising
out of the maintenance or use of the automobile in the business
of such employer. ' 4
Thus, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said that this provision was
void,
2 Narloch v. Church, 234 Wis. 155, 290 N.W. 595 -(1940).
3 Schenke v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 246 Wis. 301, 16 N.W.2d 817
(1944).4 Shanahan v. Midland Coach Lines, 268 Wis. 233, 67 N.W2d 297 (1954).
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"* * * because it provides for an exception applicable solely to
an additional insured."
5
In other words, it gave less coverage to an additional insured than
it did to the named insured, though only with respect to injury to
other employees. Since the clause was void, the motion for summary
judgment could not be granted, and the Supreme Court affirmed the
order denying the motion."
However, the policy also contained the following clause in the
Exclusion provisions:
"This policy does not apply: * * *
(d) under coverage A and C, to bodily injury to or sickness,
or death of any employee of the insured while engaged in the
employment, other than domestic, of the insured * * * ,,7
But why was the case appealed if it could be disposed of so easily
and so summarily?
The confusion in this area dates back at least as early as 1938 to
the case of Brandt v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp.8 The
policy in that case contained a clause in the coverage provisions similar
to that found in the Shanahan case and another clause in the Exclusion
provision which, though not considered, was probably valid because an
analysis reveals that that clause applied to both the named assured and
additional assureds.
The clauses provided as follows:
"Definition of Insured * * * The provisions of this paragraph
do not apply: * * *
(d) to any employee of an insured with respect to any action
brought against said employee because of bodily injury to
or death of another employee of the same insured injured
in the course of such employment in an accident arising
out of the maintenance or use of the automobile in the
business of such insured * * *
Exclusions
This policy does not apply: * * *
(e) under Coverage A, to bodily injury to or death of any
employee of the insured while engaged in the business of
the insured * * *"
The most interesting point is that the Court held that the insurer
was excused from liability by the clause in the coverage provisions
which can hardly be distinguished from the form and location of the
clause in the Shanahan case. Thirteen years later, however, the Brandt




8 Brandt v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp., 228 Wis. 328, 280 N.W. 403(1938).
9 Sandstrom v. Estate of Clausen, 258 Wis. 534, 46 N.W.2d 831 (1951).
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In 1940 in the Narloch case the Court ruled that the identical
clause in the identical place was void as in violation of the statute."0
The policy read as follows:
"This policy does not apply: * * *
(d) To any employee of an insured with respect to any action
brought against said employee because of bodily injury to
or death of another employee of the same insured injured
in the course of such employment in an accident arising
out of the maintenance or use of the automobile in the
business of such insured."
The Court stated:
"As the intended limitation by sub. (d) of the policy upon the
extensions of the indemnity is not within any of the exceptions
which are authorized under sec. 204.30(3), Stats., that intended
limitation is clearly in violation of the statute and therefore
void.""'
Though the precise language no longer seems to be applied in these
cases, we can see that the clause gave less protection to an additional
assured than to a named assured and therefore was void under the
Frye test which was to arise a few years later. 12
The Brandt case" of two years previous, though cited in the
opinion, was not discussed with reference to this clause and though
expressly distinguished on another point was not distinguished with
reference to this point. The Narloch holding'4 is, of course, in accord
with Shanahan5 and the subsequent overruling of Brandt.16 Schenke
v. State Farm1 7 also held that a restriction in the omnibus coverage
clause against any action by a named insured was void as contrary
to the statute.
Ainsworth v. Berg'8 decided after Schenke, dealt with general
exclusion provisions. There we had an insured truck, two employers
in the course of employment, negligence of one employee, the other
employee suing for his injuries. The court apparently paid no attention
to the argument that an exclusion would give less protection to the
employee than the named insured and therefore violated the purpose
of the omnibus statute. The court held the exclusion valid. This
holding would probably no longer be sustained under the Frye test,
10 Note 2, supra.
"1 Ibid.
"2Frye v. Thiege, 253 Wis. 596, 600, 34 N.W2d 793 (1948).
Is Note 8, supra.
U4 Note 2, supra.
15 Note 4, supra.
16Note 9, supra.
17 Note 3, supra.
18Ainsworth v. Berg, 253 Wis. 438, 34 N.W2d 79, 35 N.W2d 911 (1948).
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though the case was cited, nor would the Court's reasoning hold up
in view of the Sandstrom9 case.
The Sandstrom case found that the Court applying the argument
of earlier cases that "employee of the insured" means employee of
the person being sued. Thus, the exclusion was not applied and our
inquiry was not directly aided. This Sandstrom rule was recently
affirmed in Zippel v. Country Gardens, Inc.'
The Frye case 21 also dealt with a clause in the exclusion provisions
and held the clause to be valid. It was argued that the clause located
in the exclusion provisions was invalid even though not located in the
coverage provisions. The Court said:
"It is urged with considerable force that it ought not to make a
difference where the exclusion is placed in the policy because
that is a mere mechanical detail. The point is well taken to this
extent; if what is stated in the policy to be a general exclusion
of coverage in fact denies to an additional assured the same pro-
tection that is given to the named assured neither its form nor
its location in the policy will save it or give it validity."2 (Em-
phasis Supplied)
Thus, with the Brandt23 case out of the way, the other cases in
this area seemed at this point to fall into some sort of an intelligible
pattern. On the one hand we had those cases which generally con-
cerned clauses in the coverage provisions of a policy, which clauses
were ruled void, and on the other hand those cases which dealt with
clauses in the exclusion provisions of a policy, which clauses were
from case to case qualifiedly held valid. (Even these exclusion
clauses impress this writer as being violative of the Statute if, de
facto, the coverage clauses are.)
Without acknowledging the validity of this dichotomy, we can
observe its existence and recognize its supporting arguments at least
up to the Frye24 case. For, while it appeared that certain clauses,
located in the exclusion provisions of a policy could be valid under
the statute, the Frye25 case seemed to lay down a reasonable test for
their validity. To reiterate some language in Frye that has been quoted
above:
"* * * if what is stated in the policy to be a general exclusion
of coverage in fact denies to an additional assured the same pro-
tection that is given to the named assured, neither its form nor
19 Note 9, supra.
20 Zippel v. Country Gardens, Inc., 262 Wis. 567, 55 N.W2d 903 (1952).
21 Note 12, supra.
2Ibid.
23 Note 8, supra.




its location in the policy will save it or give it validity."" (Em-
phasis Supplied).
This language, of course, is in accord with the reasoning in the
Shanahan27 case and appears to be a clear statement of what should
be allowed in an automobile insurance policy under the statute.
What is difficult, then, is a reconciliation of the Supreme Court's
position in the Frye28 case, the recent Depies-9 case (upon which appel-
lant in the instant case relied) and its decision in the Shanahan" and
Narloch31 cases. In Depies"2 an employee of Depies killed a fellow
employee by negligently backing into him with a truck owned by
Depies who was insured by Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company. In that case the insurance company was held not liable.
The insurance contract contained the following provision:
"Exclusions:
This policy does not apply: * * *
(b) (2) * * * to bodily injury to or sickness, disease or death
of any employee of the insured while engaged in the employ-
ment, other than domestic, of the insured * * *
(c) (3) to any employee with respect to injury to or sickness,
disease or death of another employee of the same employer in-
sured in the course of such employment in an accident arising
out of the maintenance or use of the automobile in the business
of such employer.13 3 (Emphasis Supplied).
With the Sandstrom34 case in mind we can see what the insurer
was attempting to accomplish by the clause in its policy in Depies."5
By saying that the policy does not apply to any employee with respect
to injury to a fellow employee, the insurer gets around the argument
sustained in Sandstrom3" and Zippe 3 7 that "employee" means employee
of the person being sued. However, while the Depies clause gets
around Sandstrom,"8 it appears to run contrary to Frye because the
clause seems to give less protection to an additional assured than the
named assured.
But close examination of the policy in the Depies case reveals that
the Frye doctrine was fulfilled to the satisfaction of the Court. The
Court said that the additional assured was not given less protection
26 Ibid.
27 Note 4, supra.
28 Note 12, supra.
29 Note 1, supra.
30 Note 4, supra.
31 Note 2, supra.
32 Note 1, supra.
33 Ibid.
34 Note 9, supra.
35 Note 1, supra.
36 Note 9, supra.
37 Note 20, supra.
38 Note 9, supra.
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than the named assured because of another clause in the policy [ (b)
(2) ].n Thus, the question under the Frye doctrine was, is each clause
tested separately, or is the policy considered as a whole? The court
apparently decided to consider the policy as a whole and upheld the
exclusion provision.
40
With this fact in mind it is difficult to recognize any real dis-
tinction between Depies4 ' and Shanahan.42 If any, it should be a result
of application of the Frye43 case.
In Depies" the additional assured was not afforded less protection
than the named assured because there was another clause in the policy
which restricted the coverage of the named assured in the same way.
Neither in Shanahan4 5 was the additional assured actually afforded
less protection than the named assured by virtue of the clause located
in the coverage provisions because of the other clause in Exclusions
(quoted above) 46 which is identical to clause (b) (2) in Depies.4 7
Was it the mere location of the clause then, and not the effect of the
policy construed as a whole, as it seems it should have been construed
under Frye"8 and Depies,49 that caused the Court to hold that the
clause was void?
The Court pointed out in Shanahan" that the old type exclusion
clause (in the Exclusion provisions) could not help London Guaranty
because, under Sandstrom5' and Zippe4,52 the plaintiff was not an em-
ployee of the additional assured. What the court should have recog-
nized, considering the whole policy, is that this clause brought about
a situation where the named assured and additional assureds were
afforded the same protection and thus, the Frye53 test was met.
One can conjecture, however, that London Guaranty has revised
its Wisconsin policies to take advantage of the law of Depies.54 And
though it is beyond the scope of this paper, I merely offer in passing
that perhaps the Depies line of cases goes beyond the statute. Let me
refer to some language from Narloch:
"As the intended limitation by sub.(d) of the policy upon the
39 Note 1, supra.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Note 4, supra.
43 Note 12, supra.
44 Note 1, supra.
45 Note 4, supra.
46 Reference of note 7, supra.
47 Reference of note 33, supra.
48 Note 12, supra.
49 Note 1, supra.
50 Note 4, supra.
51 Note 9, supra.
52 Note 20, supra.
53 Note 12, supra.
54 Note 1, supra.
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extension of the indemnity is not within any of the exceptions
which are authorized under sec. 204.30(3), Stats., that intended
limitation is clearly in violation of the statute and therefore
void." 55
Subsection (d) is quoted above 6 and is a typical exclusionary
clause. In 1940 the Court was disposed to thinking that such a pro-
vision was "clearly in violation of the statute" without mentioning its
location in the policy.57
As late as 1948 in Frye the Court stated:
" * * * any intended limitation of the omnibus coverage pro-
vision required by 204.30(3), Stats., other than the exceptions
expressly authorized by the statute, is void.""'
In 1948 this strict concept apparently gave way to the idea that
the statute does riot interfere with the right to limit coverage by con-
tract.59 Has the court created an easy way to introduce exceptions to
the statute into a contract?
The case law in this area appears to make it comparatively simple
to test the validity of a clause with respect to the statute. Still, this
question arises, since the effect of the provisions in the Depies policy
would be identical to the effect of the provisions in the Shanahan
policy if given effect, why should Shanahan" have given weight to
the following language in Frye?
"On the other hand, we have held in the Narloch and Schenke
cases that there can be no modification whatever attached to
the omnibus coverage clause. An exclusion purporting to be a
part of this clause is assumed from its location to be discrimina-
tory and in any case is held to be void as an intent to add to
statutory exceptions."'1 (Emphasis Supplied).
Does this mean that Shanahan2 has actually held that location
will rule over effect? Chief Justice Fairchild in his dissent in Frye
indicated that it should not.
"I submit that such a technicality should not be allowed to de-
feat the avowed purpose of the statute. '0 3
The discernable reasoning given for this state of the law is as
follows: By putting these clauses in the Exclusion provisions of a
policy, the parties are only exercising their right of freedom of con-
55 Note 2, supra.
56 Reference of note 11, supra.
57 Note 2, supra.
58 Note 12, supra.
59 Note 18, supra.
60 Note 4, supra.
61 Note 12, supra.
62 Note 4, supra.
63 Note 12, supra.
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tract.64 As has been demonstrated, this argument ignores the ultimate
operative effect of the clauses which overreach the statute just as do
the same clauses in the coverage provisions. If the clauses are allowed
in one case, they should be allowed in all cases.
W. URBAN ZIEVERS
64 Note 18, supra.
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